The Major Transitions in Evolution is part of an important tradition in evolutionary b iology. This tradition attempts to identify large-scale patterns in life's history, and to relate those patterns to evolutionary mechanisms that can be studied empirically. Here, we sketch some of this history and give our take on the importance of these projects. But we also lay out the ways in which Maynard Smith's and Szathmáry's formulation contrasts with its predecessors, and explain the significance of those contrasts. These themes connect in many ways with individual chapters of this collection, and at times we identify those connections. But for the most part, we postpone specific discussion of the chapters to the section introductions, concentrating instead on very general themes.
2007; Knoll and Bambach 2000; McShea 1998) . Much of this work has grown out of the idea that the history of life is progressive. From simple origins, more advanced, better adapted, better designed forms have emerged, replacing their inferior predecessors. This idea has been at once influential and deeply problematic (Ruse 1996) . Making the idea of progressive change empirically tractable, and purging it of anthropocentrism, has proved extraordinarily difficult. The problem of detoxifying the concept of progress has motivated attempts to decouple work on large-scale trends from directional and progressivist ideas of history. Instead, we have seen formulations of directionality focused on complexity, diversity, or some similar surrogate for progress , though each of these has its own problems (for example, Vermeij 1987 Vermeij , 1999 .
In reflecting on this disciplinary history in their chapter, McShea and Simpson distinguish between two methods of investigating such trends. The first takes off from a distinctive account of evolutionary mechanisms. Having developed a picture of evolutionary process, theorists of this variety then ask: What will the history of life be like, if this really is how evolution works? So in this method, one begins with the resources of biological theory and asks what signature these supposed evolutionary mechanisms, if correctly identified, would have on the history of life. Two recent, theory-driven projects that roughly fit this theory-first approach to history are Mark Ridley's Mendel's Demon, which focuses on transitions in the fidelity of heritability (Ridley 2000) , and Wallace Arthur's work on developmental drive (Arthur 2004 ). Arthur argues that there are biases in the supply of variation of selection, and that these will influence large-scale evolutionary trajectories in ways we might detect. Neither of these two projects depend on any pretheoretic conception of life's history.
A second method begins with an attempt to reconstruct the idea of progress: the pretheoretic intuition that living beings constitute a series from the simplest forms at one end to humans at the other. McShea and Simpson insist that this project is legitimate. While we have probably anthropocentrically projected a comforting human illusion onto the natural world, it is also possible that we are responding to a real structure in nature. But though legitimate, so far this method has been unsuccessful. McShea and Simpson think there have been near misses, but, as yet, no one (including Maynard Smith and Szathmáry) has given a coherent, theoretically well-motivated account of the history of life in which the evolution of humanlike creatures is the predictable outcome of a driven trend.
Despite the conceptual and empirical difficulties that face these projects, the program of identifying and explaining large-scale patterns in the history of life has never stopped. For example, contrasting hypotheses are defended by Geerat Vermeij and the late Stephen Gould. Vermeij argues that the history of life is dominated by an ecological arrow of time. The world's ecosystems have been restructured over time, as high-energy, high-impact keystone species replace those with lower energetic needs and consequently a lighter footprint on their world. The relationship between high-energy and low-energy species is often asymmetric: High-energy species tend to make the environment less friendly for low-impact species but not vice versa (because they are low impact). So, although there are countless local exceptions and quiet corners, in Vermeij's model, the pace of life increases over time (Leigh, Vermeij, and Wikelski 2009; Vermeij 1999) .
Stephen Gould has articulated an influential alternative framework -his model of "passive diffusion from the left wall" (Gould 1996) . Gould accepts that, in some sense, life's history is directional. The complexity of the most complex organism extant tends to increase over time. But, Gould argues, this reflects no deep fact about the dynamics of evolution. This trend is a consequence of life's simple origins, and of the fact that while there is no maximum bound on an organism's complexity, there is a lower one. In such circumstances, many specific histories of origin and extinction, each different from and often independent of one another, will tend to sum to a trend of increasing maxima. There is a causal explanation of each data point, each twig in the history of life, but there is no unified history of the sequence as a whole (see McShea and Simpson, this volume) .
As we noted earlier, these projects are partly driven by the intrinsic importance of questions about the large-scale shape of life. But taking a big picture view of life's history also plays a crucial role in testing and refining our understanding of how evolution works. History supplies smoking guns; phenomena that provide crucial evidence for one version of evolutionary theory over others. It is a source of puzzling cases that challenge and stretch the explanatory resources of different versions of evolutionary theory. Most famously and persistently, history poses the problem of scale: of whether large-scale patterns are nothing more than the accumulated results of well-understood microevolutionary processes playing out in local populations over a few generations. So, for example, our current best reconstruction of the history of life is stocked with examples of sudden bursts of evolutionary inventiveness and the evolution of extraordinary novelties. Yet it is also rich in examples of phenotypic conservatism. Arguably, both rapidly appearing novelties and stasis call into question uniformitarian views of evolutionary change (Gould 2002) . Incorporating a larger expanse of history also enables us to explore the interplay between internal and environmental factors in driving evolutionary trajectories, for microevolutionary accounts can o ften assume a largely static environment. Knoll and Hewitt explore this interplay in their chapter on the evolution of multicellularity (see also Calcott and Sterelny submitted; Sterelny 2009 ).
Most important, deep history forces us to examine the origins of evolutionary agents whose essential characteristics are presupposed by many specific research agendas in evolutionary biology. Deep history requires us to ask about the origin not just of species but of genes, cells, organisms, and life itself. Even if evolution is, indeed, largely the history of gene change (Lynch 2007) , we need an explanation of the origins of genes and of their replication. We noted previously that history manufactures smoking guns. Arguably, the major transitions are themselves such smoking guns. Among the major transitions are episodes of the creation of new kinds of evolutionary agent: eukaryotic cells; multicelled animals; social insects. These episodes of the evolution of individuality show that selection acts on collectives of fitness-bearing agents, not just on those agents themselves, and that higher-level selection drives evolutionary trajectories.
Evolution upgraded: A Dynamic Vision of Life's History
Many big picture models of the history of life have been static, conceiving of evolutionary possibility as fixed over time. In Major Transitions in Evolution, John Maynard Smith and Eörs Szathmáry bought a much more dynamic model to debates about the history of life. Instead of conceptualizing life as evolving through a fixed, though immense, space of organic design, and asking how that space is explored over time, Maynard Smith and Szathmáry conceived of the space of biological possibility as itself evolving Szathmáry 1995, 1999; Szathmáry and Maynard Smith 1997) . One way to think of changes in life's potential is to identify key innovations. So, for example, Andrew Parker argues that the invention of sight powered massive change in the Cambrian Explosion (Parker 2003) and Nick Lane identifies a set of these innovations -such as photosynthesis, movement, and hot blood -in his Life Ascending: The Ten Great Inventions of Evolution (Lane 2009 ). These innovations also led to great expansions of phylogenetic diversity: The evolution of photosynthesis made possible the evolution of vast numbers of new species. Each expands ecospace: Organisms make a living in very new ways, and in new places, as a result of these innovations. These all seem good candidates for possibility-expanding innovations.
Maynard Smith and Szathmáry have a more profound approach. Their key events are changes in the evolutionary process itself -this is how they identified their Major Transitions (see table 1 in Szathmáry and Maynard Smith 1995) . In this view, the major transitions in evolution modify core elements of the evolutionary process itself. Like a robot that continually reprograms itself, or a factory that manufactures parts to change its own operation, evolution upgrades itself, amplifying the kinds of further change that are possible. This idea is developed in Peter Godfrey Smith's chapter and in his book on Darwinian populations (Godfrey-Smith 2009). Following Lewontin, he identifies a set of minimal conditions for evolutionary change, and then discusses ways in which those minimal conditions can be enriched to make large-scale, permanent change possible.
Two central themes in Maynard Smith and Szathmáry's book (1995) develop this idea of change in the conditions that make evolutionary change possible. One concerns the expansion of mechanisms of hereditary -where richer and more accurate systems of the intergenerational flow of information evolve. The other focuses on the evolution of new levels of biological individuality; an evolutionary change after which previously independent entities now reproduce together, sharing their evolutionary fate. Both mark out core features of the Darwinian process. One is a radical change in the kind of individual from which evolving populations and lineages are built. The other is a change in the processes relating these individuals across generations. A third, less well-explored theme, concerns the generation of variation, which they touch on in their final chapter on language. Maynard Smith and Szathmáry are impressed by both the generative and the representational capacity of language, seeing a close analogy with the informational capacity of genes. Thus, we see three core features of the Darwinian process of change -the subject of change, how change is passed on, and ways in which further change is generated -are all themselves subject to modification.
This dynamic view contrasts strongly with Gould's view that morphospace has been explored by passive diffusion from a starting point of minimal complexity. It provides a different way to conceive of the bounds on complexity, and on how they have changed throughout life's history. Even if we concede that there is simply passive diffusion from the initial minimal conditions of life (and this is controversial), the Maynard Smith and Szathmáry view suggests there is an upper bound, too. Until problems of inheritance were solved, there was an upper limit on early replicator complexity. Until a method for inheriting somatic differences in genetically identical cells was established, there was an upper limit on the complexity of multicellular organisms. And until cooperation became manageable, there was an upper limit on the size and complexity of social groups of animals, including humans.
The lower bound on organismal complexity has also changed over time. Viruses depend on harnessing and subverting important mechanisms in more complex organisms for their own evolutionary ends. Without these more complex hosts, viruses would not be possible. Dan Dennett has pointed out that there is often more than one pattern in a given set of data. In many cases, we can see different patterns, depending on the grain of our analysis and our explanatory interests (Dennett 1991) . Thus, one important and difficult issue is whether these alternative ideas of deep history are empirically distinct, competing models or just different heuristics, directing our attention in different ways to specific episodes and mechanisms. In any case, the major transitions model is heuristically powerful, for it forces us to ask important questions about the conditions of change and the stability of those c onditions.
Evolution in flux
By addressing the broad sweep of history -from early replicators through to the complexities of human language -and doing so with an eye to the changing nature of the evolutionary process itself, Maynard Smith and Szathmáry address and incorporate many challenges to the received view that have been raised in the last thirty years. Until the 1980s, virtually all of evolutionary biology focused on the causes and consequences of fitness differences among individual organisms over relatively short periods of time. The received view of evolutionary biology was organism-centered and microevolutionary. Evolutionary change took place through small changes in local populations, and these changes could be studied over relatively few generations. Mayr, Dobzhansky, Stebbins, and their allies had forged these assumptions into a postwar synthesis of whole-organism biology with the population genetics of the 1930s. Their legacy was to convince the profession that a relatively direct relationship existed both between genetic and phenotypic change (so evolution could be conceptualized as change in gene frequency) and between change in local populations and the observable patterns in longer spans of evolutionary history.
That simple picture of the relationship between microevolutionary change and the macroevolutionary pattern has never been completely accepted (for an overview, see Depew and Weber 1995) . But by the 1980s it had become openly controversial. In 1984, John Maynard Smith remarked that paleobiology was once more at the center of evolutionary biology, challenging the resources of the microevolutionary toolkit to explain patterns in the history of life (Maynard Smith 1984) . The challenge originated with Gould's and Eldredge's "punctuated equilibrium" model of species evolution. It expanded in various ways: to questions about directional trends; to the role of mass extinction in shaping life's history; to the supposed large-scale stasis in basic morphology after the Cambrian Explosion; and to issues about the role of contingency in evolutionary history. No one showed that microevolutionary mechanisms couldn't explain macroevolutionary patterns; but there was no longer a consensus that these mechanisms sufficed.
At the beginning of this ferment, paleobiology and its distinctive evidence played the key role. But gradually, molecular data began to be important, both because it made reconstructions of phylogenetic history much more reliable and especially as it allowed evolutionary biology to begin to build data about small organisms into their big picture. Microbiology played almost no role in the establishment of the synthesis consensus. If it had, Mayr's biological species concept could hardly have dominated thinking for so long. The rise of molecular biology was an inestimable boom to microbiology, giving real tools through which microbial, and especially prokaryote, evolution could be studied. The results have reshaped our picture of life's history, with (i) the establishment of the symbiotic origin of eukaryotes (Clearly, at least one utterly pivotal event in life's history was a lineage fusion, not an incrementally diverging lineage fission.); (ii) the discovery that prokaryotes are divided into two deeply diverging and biochemically very different branches, the Achaea and the Eubacteria; and (iii) the discovery that horizontal gene transfer has played, and continues to play, a central role in prokaryote evolution. It gradually became clear that evolutionary biology, in focusing on multicelled animals and plants, had ignored the importance of horizontal exchange, and the fusing of distinct lineages with complementary parts into new individuals (Doolittle and Bapteste 2007; O'Malley and Dupre 2007; Woese 2008) .
The central status of the organism as unit of selection also came under question. The challenge arose partly from theoretical concerns. In 1966, George Williams published his brilliant Adaptation and Natural Selection, arguing that the gene rather than the organism was the true unit of selection. Richard Dawkins (especially, but not alone) championed this idea, arguing that genes deserve a central role for three reasons. First, genes have effects on their environment that make them more or less likely to be replicated. Second, genes are replicated in ways that make cumulative evolution possible. Third, while genes' advantageous environmental effects are usually effects on the organisms of which they are a part, that is not universally so. Dawkins's The Extended Phenotype put both the nature and the importance of biological individuality into question, arguing that the reach of the gene extended beyond the boundaries of the organism.
But the status of the organism also began to be questioned in broader contexts. One was historical. In 1987, Leo Buss's Evolution of Individuality argued that individuality was a derived character, and that the unit of selection could itself change over the course of evolution. At roughly the same time, the role of groups returned to the debating table and, more important, the importance of cooperation moved to center stage. Williams's critique of good-for-the-species explanations and Hamilton's kin-selected model of cooperative behavior jointly seemed to kill high-level models of selection stone dead. But from the late 1980s, driven largely by the persistence of David Sloan Wilson, multilevel selection m odels crept back into view. Wilson and others argued that there were cases resistant to kin selection explanations and that some versions of multilevel selection models were much less unrealistic in their assumptions than had been suggested. Researchers began talking about eusocial insects as superorganisms again (for example, in Seeley's Wisdom of the Hive).
These issues are still being debated, though with increasing consensus and theoretical clarity (West, Griffin, and Gardner 2007) . Perhaps the most important result of this debate was the focus on the importance of cooperation, and its relevance at all levels in the hierarchy of life (Michod and Herron, 2006) . In particular, it has become clear that cooperation has played a deep and important role in the evolution of life's complexity, resulting in alliances both within and across species, and producing stable, reproducing, units that can be treated as individuals in their own right within a Darwinian framework.
Last, claims that developmental biology had been "left out" of the modern synthesis began to emerge. An explosion in our understanding of how development works, including the discovery of so-called master genes, along with a wealth of information about species' genomes, provoked a reevaluation of the importance of the relationship between evolutionary and developmental biology. Exactly what this claim amounted to was often far from clear, but a central issue revolved around understanding the origins of variation. Although the synthesis relied on variation, it lacked a theory of the source of such variation (Kirschner and Gerhart 2005). Such a theory is important in evolutionary biology, for unless the supply of variation is rich and unbiased -providing a uniform variety to be selected -that supply will influence evolutionary trajectories (Arthur 2004) . Importantly, many of the discoveries from developmental genetics suggested that we have no reason to expect the supply of variation to be, in general, unbiased and unlimited. So the simple, Fisherian model of variation is slowly being replaced by more realistic alternatives. Kirschner and Gerhart have made one promising attempt to develop a general theory of variation, and while they emphasize multicellular development, their principles of developmental organization are formulated very generally. It is therefore possible that these principles of developmental organization -principles that result in biases in the supply of variation -could be used to characterize multiple levels in the biological hierarchy.
One response to these challenges, though a dull one, would be to maintain that the standard narrative is essentially true, but with exceptions. Selection acts on populations of organisms, and change over time is the summed result of these population-level events, unless those organisms are too old, too small, too social, or have too inefficient mechanisms for establishing a division between germline and soma. Maynard Smith and Szathmáry offer a much more interesting alternative. Instead, we should see the exceptions as transitions to (or in some cases, from -see Leroi, Koufopanou, and Burt 2003) the standard case. Understanding the exceptions, and why exceptions exist in some lineages, is crucial to understanding the scope and limits of the more familiar model of evolution as change in local populations of organisms.
What Do The Transitions Share?
No one will deny that the events identified by Maynard Smith and Szathmáry are important and interesting. But is that all they share? Why these transitions, and not others? McShea and Simpson (this volume) push the problem of unity hard; they doubt that Maynard Smith and Szathmáry's major transitions capture the same kind of evolutionary episode, even though each may be individually important. Of course, the transitions need not be unified in this strong sense for them to be worth studying as a group. As we have suggested, family resemblances might still exist between them, so that studying one offers heuristic insight into others, and they may be similar in that each offers a striking challenge to received models of evolutionary theory.
That said, there has been a vigorous tradition of seeing the transitions as unified; those who have followed up Maynard Smith and Szathmáry's ideas, especially, have taken the common thread to be the evolution of new kinds of evolutionary individuals (Michod 1999, in particular) . This emphasis is reflected in the content of the current volume: The majority of the papers are concerned with some aspect of transitions in individuality. As we have suggested, there is a more expansive way to interpret these transitions -one that involves not just transitions in individuality, but any shift in the core components of the evolutionary process.
Peter Godfrey-Smith (this volume and Godfrey-Smith 2009) introduces a conceptual framework that is helpful in exploring this idea, and also in responding to the challenge from McShea and Simpson. Godfrey-Smith co-opts Richard Lewontin's classical formulation of the minimum conditions of evolution to introduce the concept of a Darwinian population. A Darwinian population is a population of agents that reproduce, but not with equal prospects of success, and in such a way that descendents resemble their parents. Thus, Darwinian populations satisfy the minimum conditions for evolutionary change, and a Darwinian individual is simply a member of a Darwinian population. As Godfrey-Smith points out, there are central and peripheral instances of Darwinian populations, for there are clear and marginal cases of reproduction, clear and marginal cases of inheritance, and perhaps clear and marginal cases of fitness differences. Second, he points out that reproduction, fitness difference, and inheritance are only the minimal conditions for evolutionary change. If evolutionary change in a population is to generate complex outcomes, the population must satisfy extra conditions, though the identity of those extra conditions remains controversial. A core case of a Darwinian population, then, is a population that (i) clearly and unambiguously satisfies the minimum conditions for evolutionary change, and (ii) also satisfies (to an important extent) the extra conditions, whatever they may be, that make possible the evolution of complex traits.
At the beginning of a transition, then, we have a population of Darwinian agents interacting with others in fitness-affecting ways. But that population is itself structured: Interactions are patterned so that local groups interact with one another in ways that contrast with their interactions with agents outside that local group. So there are groups -c ollections -of interacting Darwinian agents. At the beginning of a transition, these collections are at best peripheral or marginal cases of Darwinian agents, and the metapopulation of groups is at best a peripheral example of a Darwinian population. The group members, on the other hand, are core Darwinian agents. By the end of a transition, the collections have become collectives. They are now core Darwinian agents in an unambiguously Darwinian population. Their members are still present, but they have become parts of collectives, and the evolutionary fate of those surviving descendents is now welded together. Often, they are no longer clear cases of Darwinian individuals in a Darwinian population. Thus, at the end of a transition, we see a new evolutionary agent -a collective. But that single agent is more structurally complex than those we saw interacting at the beginning of the process. The major transitions are episodes in which the vertical complexity of life has increased through the transformation of a collection or group into a collective.
Consider, for example, eukaryote origins. There is ongoing controversy about the identity of the partners and the process of fusion through which the eukaryote cell first appeared (de Duve 2007). But there is no doubt that the eukaryotes evolved through such a transition. The ancestors of the mitochondrion (and perhaps the nucleus) -now a part of the eukaryote -were once independent organisms, fitness bearers in their own right. They were once paradigm Darwinian individuals; they are now parts of a more structurally complex Darwinian individual, and are themselves less clear cases of Darwinian individuality. Many of the canonical transitions are naturally seen as the evolution of a new form of Darwinian individual, and as expanding the space of biological possibility as a result. We know very little about the earliest transitions identified by Maynard Smith and Szathmáry. But the aggregation of independent replicators into compartments and into protochromosomes are such cases (if life as we know it was built via such stages). So, too, is the evolution of multicelled and social organisms.
There are two problems in thinking that the major transitions just are transitions in individuality. First, David Queller has pointed out that there seem to be two very different transitions in individuality: "egalitarian" and "fraternal" transitions (Queller 2000) . Perhaps these should not be lumped together. Eukaryote evolution is the paradigm of an egalitarian transition, for the partnership that became the new Darwinian individual did not begin with an association between closely related individuals. In contrast, the evolution of multicelled organisms (and eusocial animals) is a fused alliance between close relatives. Explaining these two types of transition poses quite different challenges. In egalitarian transitions, differentiation between the partners, and hence the potential profits of specialization, come for free. But there is no automatic overlap of evolutionary interest, and (in the first instance, anyway) no possibility of a division of reproductive labor. And so there are potentially unmanageable problems of conflict. In fraternal transitions, there is an overlap of evolutionary interest (in clones, identity), so the problem of conflict is less pressing. But the profit of cooperation is more elusive, as differentiation does not predate partnership (see also Calcott 2008) .
Second, as McShea and Simpson point out, neither the evolution of sex nor the evolution of the distinctive forms of human social life fits this model of the making of a major transition. Of course, the list is not sacred. Perhaps major transitions are just transitions in individuality, and Maynard Smith and Szathmáry simply got the membership wrong. It is also possible that appearances are deceptive. Michod (this volume) argues that sex does fit this model, because, at least in those lineages for which sex is essential for reproduction, the mating pair rather than the mating individuals are the real bearers of fitness. It is the pair that succeeds or fails. Human culture might fit the model, if, as is sometimes argued, l anguage-mediated cultural learning, and that alone, explains why group selection has been a powerful force shaping human evolution (Boehm 2000; Richerson and Boyd 2001) . Thus, it might be possible to shoehorn these examples into this conception of a transition after all, but it would be shoehorning.
One way of seeing a common feature among the major transitions is therefore to look to population structure and selective environment. Calcott (this volume) points out that most work on transitions in individuality takes this approach. This work poses the following question: What was it about the early-transition population structure and environment that made selection for cooperation so powerful that agents did not just evolve to cooperate, but evolved a ballistic commitment to cooperate, giving up the capacity to reproduce independently? Calcott suggests that there is a quite different strategy for identifying the unifying features of transitions -an engineering strategy that focuses on the structure not of populations but of prototypical individuals within them. Expansions in phenotype complexity (as when a collection of individuals fuse into a collective individual) pose engineering problems. Organisms must be constructed and maintained in different ways as they change in size and complexity, especially given that organisms must function while they change (both in ontogeny, and over evolutionary time). For example, Knoll and Hewitt (this volume) explore the problem of resource flow, and the constraint that flow imposes on multicellularity. As multicelled lineages evolve from threads and films to organisms with internal structure, modest increases in size and three-dimensional complexity exceed the limits of systems dependent on diffusion. The evolution of new kinds of individuals typically involves changes in physical scale, not just solutions to cooperation dilemmas. While the mechan ical details of engineering challenges will differ across transitions, Calcott suggests the general character of both challenge and solution may well be invariant. For example, all transitions to new complex individuals depend on managing differentiation and the division of labor without top-down control, transitions in increasingly complex management without managers.
One of Maynard Smith and Szathmáry's own ideas dovetails with Calcott's line of thought. We develop the idea briefly as an example of an alternative way of seeing common features across the transitions, for, while they certainly discuss transitions in individuality, they also suggest that the major transitions are transitions in the mechanisms of inheritance involving innovations that expand the fidelity and bandwidth of inheritance. We see these ideas of inheritance as importantly connected to transitions in individuality, for increasing vertical complexity increases the problem of developmental control. Cumulative evolution depends on high-fidelity inheritance, and high-fidelity inheritance depends on sending developmental signals across the generation with high bandwidth and fidelity, and sending them in ways that enable these signals to structure development in the next generation. Increasingly complex phenotypes can evolve only if gene replication with high fidelity and bandwidth also evolves. But that is not enough; genes must be turned on and off in the right sequence, and in predictable environments.
Expansions in vertical complexity therefore increase the demands on inheritance mechanisms. Multicelled organisms have evolved many times (Bonner 1998) , but only in a few cases have these lineages generated impressive disparity and diversity. The evolution of complex multicellularity requires the evolution of a higher-level unit with its own fitness values. But it requires more -the evolution of a developmental cycle -and that in turn requires a major advance in mechanisms of inheritance. Protist genes never have to contribute to building afresh the critical inner cellular structures of protists. The reproduction of these crucial intercellular structures can largely be reduced to growth and fission. In contrast, organs and tissues do not exist in miniature in fertilized ova. Complex multicelled organisms exist only because there are developmental cycles in which key structures of adult organisms are rebuilt from scratch in the new generation. So the problem of crossgeneration fidelity is much more pressing for macrobes than for microbes.
For this reason, Calcott and I have suggested that the Cambrian Explosion really does constitute a major transition by the lights of Maynard Smith and Szathmáry, even though it is not on their canonical list (see also Jablonka and Lamb 2006, but for somewhat different reasons). We suggest that the egg is a major breakthrough, allowing the flow of genes across the generations to orchestrate development in a fine-grained and reliable way (Calcott and Sterelny submitted; Sterelny 2009). Such developmental control, we suggest, was essential to build complex bilaterians. This suggestion -admittedly, very speculativedevelops an idea of Scott Gilbert (Gilbert 2001) . He outlines a program for integrating developmental biology with ecology, taking into account ecological influences on development. But environments do not just happen to organisms; organisms help make their own environment and those in which their offspring develop. Termites, for example, develop in a world built by and for termites. As a consequence, their developmental environment has been stabilized. Compared to their presocial ancestors, termite genes are expressed in a narrowed range of developmental environments, and hence the phenotypic effects of those genes are more predictable. We suspect that such increased parental control of developmental environments was crucial to the Metazoan radiation. In discussing inheritance, Maynard Smith and Szathmáry emphasize transitions in the kind and quantity of information transmitted across the generations. But for genes to have stable phenotypic effects, they must be inserted into a sufficiently structured and predictable developmental environment. It is no use just sending genes; the parental generation must build an environment in which those genes are used in the right way. As the developmental pathway becomes more complex, the gene-reading environment becomes as important as signal quantity and fidelity. The egg is such a structured system. It is adapted both to function in an environment and to provide an initial set of triggers for gene expression.
The various transformations in the fidelity and bandwidth of inheritance thus suggest a largely unexplored facet of Maynard Smith and Szathmáry's Major Transitions. The common feature of the transitions is that they involve important innovations in inheritance and developmental control. Those innovations will vary immensely in detail in particular cases, but they all either enable more information to flow across the generations or increase the reliability and precision with which that information is used.
Looking forward
John Maynard Smith and Eörs Szathmáry presented the Major Transitions as the beginning of a research program, not its culmination. As we shall see, in the decade and more that has followed, their legacy has been developed in important ways. Most obviously, important work has been done on specific transitions: on eusociality; the origins of eukaryote cells; and especially multicellularity. There has been a very rich development of the theory of multi-level selection, and its application to the problem of individuality. There has been less focus on identifying other conditions that make major evolutionary change possible. Some of the strengths of this legacy are explored and further developed in the chapters that follow. But there is also some attempt to make at progress on the less well traveled roads signposted within Major Transitions in Evolution.
